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Ian CONDRY
“I don’t mind being poor”
In a song from 2014, the Japanese rapper Kohh offers an intriguing perspective on 
youth culture in Japan’s “lost decades” （ushinawareta nijyūnen）.
　　貧乏なんて気にしない
　　目の前にお金が無くても幸せな事がいっぱい
　　あるから大丈夫　色んな事もっとしたい
　　大金持ちでも心の中が貧乏じゃ意味無い
　　わざわざ見栄張って値段が高いルイ　グッチ　ヴェルサーチ
　　本当に必要な物以外全く必要じゃない
　　何かあったら周りのいい友達が助けてくれたり
　　ありがとう　ごめんなさい
　　っていうより行動が大事
　　みんな言う　お金よりも愛
　　I don’t mind being poor
　　Even without money, I’m fortunate in many ways
　　I’ll be OK, and there’s lots I want to do
　　It’s meaningless to be rich, if your heart is poor
　　I don’t need to show off with expensive Louis Vuitton, Gucci or Versace
　　Really, unnecessary things, I can do without
　　If I have trouble, I’ll get help from my friends
　　Actions are more important than 
　　Saying “Thank you” and “I’m sorry”
　　Everyone says, love is more important than money
Kohh, “Binbō nante ki ni shinai” from his album Monochrome （2014）
Such a view likely echoes the feelings of many young people who have grown up 
during the years of Japan’s economic malaise, and it is small wonder that young peo-
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ple are looking for satisfaction beyond economic success. As such, the song offers a 
view of youth culture increasingly divorced from the vacillations of economic growth 
and decline, focused instead on peer-group support, generosity, and sharing. How 
widespread are these views? It’s impossible to know from a single song. But what’s in-
triguing is that this view, which moves away from individualistic, rational self-interest 
as a defining motivator, also echoes some developments in the emerging industries 
around music.
　　Music provides an intriguing perspective on industry transition, both in Japan and 
beyond. In particular, in some realms of popular culture, social value within communi-
ties leads to the possibility of extracting economic value by businesses. By this I mean, 
if we want to see how new industries can develop, and which ones offer models of 
more inclusive forms of capitalism, we might first attend to creative communities 
driven by passion and commitment. These spaces form the foundation upon which 
new business models can develop, even amidst a continuing decline in recorded music 
sales. Music is particularly intriguing because we are witnessing a variety of new 
businesses that depend on a balance between social and economic value, whether 
through merchandising pop idols or crowdfunding as a means to gain capital for artis-
tic production. Such new business models offer a new perspective on contemporary is-
sues around income inequality.
　　Recently, we see a growing interest both in the public and the academic literature 
regarding worsening income inequality, a topic that extends from questions of precar-
ity, for example in new “gig economies” （Berlant 2011）, to historical and contemporary 
understandings of economic inequality （Piketty and Goldhammer 2014）. Music is par-
ticularly interesting as an industry in transition, “hollowed out” by both technological 
and cultural shifts, and yet demonstrating a remarkable vibrancy in adapting to new 
socio-economic contexts. The variety of responses are resulting in a panoply of busi-
ness models. From J-pop idol culture to underground DJ culture, from global tech 
companies’ work in streaming music such as Spotify and YouTube to crowdfunding 
initiatives for supporting new music projects through sites like Kickstarter and Pat-
reon （Palmer 2014）. This diversity of approaches gives us a chance to assess what 
this variety of efforts at achieving sustainable livelihoods within music can tell us 
about the dynamics that can lead to more inclusive forms of capitalism, as opposed to 
reproducing the exceeding concentrations of wealth. Can music alone solve inequality? 
I don’t think so. But music can allow us to see and compare different social-economic 
assemblages―an awkward term but meant to signal something more than “business 
models”―for their inclusiveness or lack thereof. 
　　Focusing on creative communities as the harbinger of new businesses reminds us, 
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as many scholars have argued （Miller 1997; Graeber 2011）, that capitalism is not a 
single, monolithic system, but a diverse mix of socio-economic relations. Even so, the 
French economist Thomas Piketty, in his 2014 book Capital in the Twenty-First Cen-
tury, identifies a troubling trend in which those who have extreme wealth have been 
able to capture a growing share of the economy, eating away at economic growth 
from labor productivity. Put simply, the super-rich extract “rent,” a term that refers 
not only to real estate rentals, but more broadly financial extraction based on a power 
relationship （e.g., monopoly rents） in contrast to productive labor. Piketty calls this 
relationship r ＞ g, where “r” is the rate of return on capital, historically since the late 
1800s around 5 ％, and “g” is the growth rate from gains in labor productivity, histori-
cally about 2 ％. Since “r” is greater than “g,” each younger generational cohort is 
being used as a means to further enrich a historically already-very-rich cohort. Thus, 
Piketty’s main finding is that over time the super-rich, many of whom achieved their 
wealth from inheritance, are able to extract income from those who are working now. 
Put simply, “the past devours the future.” That’s why I think it is reasonable to call 
this dynamic “zombie capitalism,” because, figuratively at least, the dead are eating 
the living. 
　　What can be done? Piketty’s response is to call for a global tax on wealth, an idea 
widely ridiculed for being impossible to achieve. But Piketty’s aim may be more im-
portant than the policy itself. Such a tax would not be aimed at substantial redistribu-
tion, Piketty argues, but rather at achieving greater transparency, which, he hopes, 
will lead to a stronger political movement to do something significant about income in-
equality. He also calls for more cooperation among the social sciences, and he criticizes 
Economics departments for leveraging elite privilege and going it alone rather than 
working more closely with other academic disciplines.
The truth is that economics should never have sought to divorce itself from the 
other social sciences and can advance only in conjunction with them. The social 
sciences collectively know too little to waste time on foolish disciplinary squab-
bles. If we are to progress in our understanding of the historical dynamics of the 
wealth distribution and the structure of social classes, we must obviously take a 
pragmatic approach and avail ourselves of the methods of historians, sociologists, 
and political scientists as well as economists. We must start with fundamental 
questions and try to answer them. （Piketty 2014: 32―33）.
In reading Piketty’s book, I was struck by how anthropologists too can contribute to 
this work on inequality, especially by asking, what would constitute more inclusive 
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forms of capitalism and how might they develop? What forms of social value lead to 
economic value? In other words addition to identifying the super-rich and their ex-
tractive ways, it seems to me that we must also identify what kinds of investments 
can lead to more productive, less extractive, economic forms. It is here that an ethno-
graphic approach to different ways of achieving livelihoods in music can offer a win-
dow on a diversity of socio-economic models and outcomes. Fieldwork is particularly 
well-suited to this kind of investigation because there is nothing like “being there” as a 
means to evaluate what kinds of events, collectives, and happenings are “where the 
action is.” This essay is an early attempt to explore some of those possibilities.
　　I would argue that in contrast to zombie capitalism we can observe a counterveil-
ing tendency towards what might be called “cyborg capitalism.” The image in my 
head is drawn from the “Ghost in the Shell” manga and anime series, in which, in the 
future, a person’s living consciousness （or “ghost”） can be ported to a technological 
body （the “shell”） which is also connected to a wider information network, both static 
data and person-to-person communication. In this context, a cyborg is characterized 
by a symbiosis between humans and technology, embedded in, but also enlivening the 
networks of relations that are physical, social, technological, political and economic. 
　　It is this idea of “community and network symbiosis” that lies at the heart of I 
propose calling “cyborg capitalism,” and offers a contrast to “zombie capitalism,” 
whereby the dead devour the living （i.e., inherited wealth increasingly extracts income 
from productive labor）. Of course, there are not only two kinds of capitalism, but this 
contrast is meant to highlight some of the distinctions that can help us evaluate differ-
ent forms of social-economic assemblages. Cyborg ideals are clearly evident in Kohh’s 
song, which emphasizes an alternative vision of value, beyond the purely economic. As 
he says, “love is more important than money,” and “I don’t mind being poor” because if 
necessary, I can get help from friends. This move away from an instrumental, rational 
actor individualism is characteristic, I would say, of a sensibility that is more cyborg 
than zombie. Before turning to this distinction, let’s consider how Japan’s lost decades 
look in terms of inequality. 
Japan’s lost decades seen through the lens of inequality （not so bad）
Another aspect of viewing youth culture during the lost decades in Japan involves 
considering how varieties of capitalism are related to government policies. In some 
ways, the lost decades of Japan look less worrisome when compared with develop-
ments in the US. This reminds us that “zombie capitalism” and “cyborg capitalism” 
are just ways of evaluating different processes of economic development and change. 
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　　In his 2015 book, Nobel Prize-winning economist Joseph Stiglitz collected a range 
of his essays viewing recent economic developments through the lens of inequality. 
Contrary to my understanding of Japan’s lost decades, he highlights contrasts that 
make Japan look better than the US in measures of inequality since the 1990s. He 
identifies the time when the expansion of inequality takes off, in the 1980s, with the 
reforms of government leaders like Ronald Reagan, Margaret Thatcher, and Yasuhiro 
Nakasone. Stiglitz （2013: 416） explains: “The ‘reforms’ that were part of the zeitgeist 
of the 1980s” contributed to the growth in inequality in country after country, “includ-
ing tax changes that were of enormous benefit to the very rich and the liberalization 
of financial markets.” So, inequality worsened in advanced nations, including Japan, the 
US and many European countries. 
　　I’ve always associated Japan’s lost decades with the idea of “anemic growth,” 
measured in terms of gross domestic product. But Stiglitz adds an important layer of 
nuance to this common understanding. 
Japan’s slow growth does not look so bad under close examination. Any serious 
student of economic performance needs to look not only at overall growth, but at 
growth related to the size of the population. Japan’s working age population （ages 
15―64） shrank 5．5 percent from 2001 to 2010, while the number of Americans 
that age increased by 9．2 percent, so we should expect to see lower growth. （Sti-
glitz 2013: 335）
This means, Stiglitz adds, “Japan’s real economic output, per member of the labor 
force, grew at a faster rate over the first decade of the century than that of the 
United States, Germany, Britain, or Australia” （Ibid.）. America’s millennial decade was 
worse than Japan’s when measured in terms of this more nuanced analysis of growth. 
　　Japan is also better than the US in addressing inequality. Consider the Gini coeffi-
cient, a standard measure of inequality, with zero as perfect equality, and 1 for perfect 
inequality. According to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
（OECD）, the Gini coefficient for both countries before taxes and transfer payments is 
about the same for the two countries: 0．499 for the US, and 0．488 for Japan （Stiglitz: 
336）. But the US does less to mitigate inequality than Japan, bringing it down to 0．38 
for the US and 0．33 for Japan. Or, consider another measure of inequality: the average 
income of the top 10％ is 15．9 times that of the bottom 10 percent in the US, com-
pared with 10．7 times for Japan （Ibid）. Such variation reinforces our understandings 
that differences in inequality are related to political decisions, not economic inevitabil-
ity. 
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　　On still other measures of inequality, Japan does better than the US as well, even 
if there is still work to be done. Stiglitz notes that Japan needs to do better in caring 
for its “older old,” those over 75. In 2008, the OECD estimated that 25．4％ of Japan’s 
“older old” lived in relative poverty, that is, with incomes less than half of the national 
median, which is still marginally better than the US （27．4％）, but far worse than the 
OECD average of 16．1％ . But Japan does much better than the US in terms of child-
hood poverty: Some 14．9％ of Japan’s children are poor, compared to a shocking 23．1 
％ of American children. It’s hard to know how directly to relate this to Japan’s glob-
ally successful, youthful popular culture, but it does indicate that there should be a 
higher percentage of young people in Japan with spare money to spend, thus being 
consumers who support new businesses. 
Where do new jobs come from?
For both Japan and the US, a common concern, especially for the younger generation, 
is what new industries might emerge to replace formerly good-paying jobs in manu-
facturing. Will there be sufficient economic growth to support new jobs? Piketty points 
out that even relatively low growth rates, for example of 1 ％ or 1．5％ per year can 
still mean large changes when measured over the course of a generation. Over a pe-
riod of thirty years, he says, a growth rate of 1 ％ per year corresponds to cumulative 
growth of 35％ , and 1．5％ growth corresponds to cumulative growth of 50％ （Piketty: 
95）. Piketty adds that such changes will have a powerful impact on the structure of 
employment: “when output per head increases by 35 to 50 percent in thirty years, that 
means that a very large fraction―between a quarter and a third―of what is produced 
today, and therefore between a quarter and a third of occupations and jobs, did not 
exist thirty years ago” （Piketty: 95―96）. You can’t work in bridge repair until bridges 
are built. Those who maintain the Internet, hardware and software, are in jobs that 
didn’t exist before the Internet. While some scholars focus on the various jobs that are 
lost （Brynjolfsson and McAfee 2014）, we should also turn our attention to the possibil-
ities for future industries to emerge. It is here that I think anthropology can provide 
useful insights into where new jobs can come from, through the advantages of re-
search by fieldwork and ethnography. 
　　I learned from doing ethnographic research into cultural production that fieldwork 
can give one a very clear sense of which groupings have a kind of positive energy, a 
forward momentum. By “being there,” we can see where the action is. Although there 
many types of “action,” and defining once and for all what that means is impossible, 
nevertheless, I would say that there would be wide agreement on where the action 
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isn’t, where negative social forces conspire to limit the possibilities for creative pro-
duction. Furthermore, anthropology provides a way of thinking about the democratiza-
tion of social research. By living among the people, learning their language, and to 
some extent participating in their worlds, ethnographers can learn about the things 
that matter to people, their daily struggles and aspirations. If we take a more demo-
cratic and open approach to observing what people value, this can provide insight into 
where new industries can and should emerge. This would be a contrast to beginning 
discussions of new jobs from the perspectives of short-sighted elites who try to main-
tain older, exploitative systems, just like zombies that devour the living. 
　　Stiglitz offers a striking insight for thinking about where new jobs come from. 
Rather than pointing to the super-rich as “job creators,” he argues instead that con-
sumers, especially those who have the wherewithal to purchase things, are the real 
drivers of new job creation.
Around the world there is a wealth of creativity, an abundance of entrepreneur-
ship, if there is adequate demand （and if certain other preconditions are satisfied, 
such as access to capital and adequate infrastructure）. In this view, the real “job 
creators” are consumers; and the reason that American and European countries 
have not been creating jobs is that stagnant incomes mean stagnant demand. （Sti-
glitz 2013: 415）
This perspective reinforces the idea that creative communities, as they build audi-
ences and participants, can drive the creation of new industries. We can see this in 
many ways, notably in history of the animation industry and in the phenomenon 
around Hatsune Miku（初音ミク）, Japan’s leading virtual idol. First, animation.
　　A century ago, animation was just being invented as a ludicrously labor-intensive 
media form, merging cartoon drawing with film, such that frames of film would need 
to be drawn, and then filmed, one frame at a time, to create the illusion of movement. 
It is an insane idea, and very few people can get rich in such a field. Yet animation 
has become a multi-billion dollar industry. Why Japan? Because it had a consumer 
base that was broader and more engaged than in the US. By some estimates, 60％ of 
the world’s TV broadcast cartoons are Japanese in origin （JETRO 2005）. In simple 
terms, I would argue that Japan’s success highlights Stiglitz’s notion that consumers 
are job creators. Again, a comparative study is instructive.
　　Both Japan and the US had vibrant comic book publishing in the early 1950s, but 
publishers in the two countries took different paths in the mid-fifties. In the US, the 
research of psychiatrist Frederic Wertham and his sensationalist book, The Seduction 
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of the Innocent, led to widespread concern that American comic books were harming 
children through their violent and sexy content. The research was later debunked 
when Wertham was found to have distorted his findings and misrepresented his inter-
viewees. At the time, however, congressional hearings were held, and American pub-
lishers, feeling the pressure, acted by developing the Comics Code Authority in 1954, 
which screened American comic books for offensive content （Hajdu 2008）. US comic 
authors were required to produce works suitable only for children. In Japan as well, 
there was outcry against violent and salacious comic books, but manga publishers 
were able to keep producing works for a larger and older audience, in addition to 
works for children. This meant a much broader fan-base for manga, the most success-
ful of which were then turned into anime. Anime’s global success, in other words, 
hinges in part on the broader audience for manga in Japan. Consumers were job cre-
ators, just as Stiglitz argues. Because Japan has a comic fandom that spans all genera-
tions and well represents content for both men and women, this group of consumers 
underpins the later globalization of anime. The social value of manga characters is 
what lays the foundation for economic value in business models. The large and varied 
audience for manga characters is further reinforced through fan-made manga （dōjin-
shi） and the annual Comic Market, which draws upwards of half a million people to 
its largest summertime convention. 
Hatsune Miku as Cyborg Capitalism
　　Another example of this principle of “community first, business second” can be 
seen in the case of Japan’s leading virtual idol, Hatsune Miku. 1 In a video of a concert 
in Japan, we see about a thousand fans packed into a Tokyo music club, many with 
glow sticks in the shape of green leeks, eagerly anticipating the arrival of the star of 
the show. As the music starts, suddenly Miku appears, as if rising through the stage. 
There is a live band behind her, but all the focus is on Miku herself, a life-size ani-
mated cartoon image of a teenage girl with long blue ponytails and enormous anime 
eyes, singing and dancing on stage. As she waves her willowy arms, she belts out the 
first words to her song “World Is Mine” （Wārudo izu main）: 
　　世界で一番のお姫さま
　　そういう扱い心得てよね
1 　These sections on Miku are adapted from an essay in the Japanese Popular Culture Reader, 
edited by Alisa Freedman and Toby Slade （forthcoming from Routledge）.
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　　I’m the number one princess in the world 
　　And you’re going to treat me that way. Right? 
Then she coquettishly wags a finger, and the crowd goes wild. 
　　I saw Miku perform at a concert in New York City in October 2014, and earlier 
in Los Angeles at the fan convention Anime Expo in July 2011. The Los Angeles show 
sold out within days of going on sale, with one commentator saying 6，000 tickets were 
sold. In the concert hall, before the show began, the air was festive and electric. I 
overheard a fan sitting next to me, speaking to her friend, both in costume. “We’re 
making history,” she said, and her friend nodded solemnly. 
　　Hatsune Miku is Japan’s leading virtual idol. She began life as voice synthesizer 
software released in 2007 by Crypton Future Media Inc., a company based in Sapporo 
in northern Japan. Crypton sells the software, but takes a more open-source approach 
to the use of Miku’s image, generally allowing fans to use the image for free. Over 
time, an enormous fan community has emerged around Miku, primarily in Japan but 
extending worldwide. 
　　In Japan, Miku’s world is recognizable as part of a dōjin （pronounced “dough 
gene”） culture populated by fans who create derivative works, such as comic books, 
figurines, illustrations, and so on, based on their favorite 2 D characters. The term 
dōjin uses the characters “same” and “person,” implying a peer but also an amateur, 
generally more than a consumer, someone who makes things, usually in a group. Fan 
“circles” （sākuru） are the groups that make dōjinshi （fan comics）, dōjin music, dōjin 
games, and so on. For lack of a better term, I would propose “fan-made” as the trans-
lation for dōjin, with “fan” representing the active amateur aspect and “made” refer-
ring to the circles and creators who churn out projects. 
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　　How did the Miku community emerge, and what does it tell us about the mix of 
social and economic values involved? In 2007, the Miku voice-synthesizer software 
gave desktop musicians a new instrument: a woman’s singing voice. This was Cryp-
ton’s business, namely, selling digital sounds and software to be used in audio produc-
tion. But as music creators began sharing their songs online, others in the online （and 
offline） world participated in other ways, making illustrations or animated dance vid-
eos to go with the songs. With the explosion of this online production, a crowd of audi-
ence members also emerged through commenting―positively, negatively, sometimes 
seriously, often irreverently―and in the process lent moral support, engaged in aes-
thetic criticism, or just aimed to have fun. In the first couple years, the business of 
Miku was Crypton selling the software, and all the other fan activity was in a largely 
non-commercial space. I mean “non-commercial” in the sense that fan producers pay, 
but do not get paid for their productivity. 
　　Creative communities are spaces where social value takes precedence over eco-
nomic exchange. It was through the interactions of fans―creating lyrics, fashion 
styles, dance movements, and in the process her personality―that Miku changed from 
a vocal instrument into a “vocal character,” as Crypton calls her. The crowd of ama-
teur creators and active audiences became a kind of foundation upon which economic 
activity would later develop. And businesses did develop, with a popular videogame 
for arcades and handheld devices, songs popular for karaoke singing, and CDs that 
have become bona-fide hits, including the “World Is Mine” song mentioned above. 
　　The larger significance is that we can see how new areas of the music world are 
developing new audiences and in the process new models of support at a time when 
the market for recordings is in steep decline. Though it’s worth noting that spending 
for other aspects of music are increasing, such as for live shows and musical instru-
ments. In contrast to record companies, might Miku offer a more equitable and demo-
cratic realm of popular culture? It’s too soon to tell, but there are some promising 
signs. Miku illuminates the ways that creative communities, often energized by 
non-economic motivations, can form the basis for the emergence of new businesses, in-
deed, whole new kinds of industries. The significance of those industries depends not 
only on their capitalization but also on the social dynamics that underpin the econo-
mies. This is not to say this “foundation” is devoid of exploitation, discrimination, and 
excess, but, as we will see, what is interesting is how the maker of Miku software, 
Crypton Future Media, has attempted to deal with the challenges of mediating be-
tween the social communication aspect of Miku and the businesses that are emerging 
around the phenomenon. 
　　Music journalist Shiba Tomonori describes the effect of Miku as nothing less than 
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“sekai o kaeta” （changing the world）. He notes, for example, that everyone can be a 
kuriētā （creator） and, more importantly perhaps, can connect with like-minded cre-
ators.
With the Internet of the twenty-first century, anyone can make a name for his or 
herself by becoming a creator. Nowadays, it’s become normal for amateur cre-
ators, not only professionals, to make various kinds of content and have it con-
sumed. Moreover, the Net is giving rise to creators making relationships among 
themselves. A new culture is blossoming, nurturing collaborations across fields. 
Put simply, this is an entry to an era of “100 million creators” （Shiba 2014: 4 ）
In the case of Miku, according to Crypton’s website, over 100，000 songs have been 
produced by “Miku-P” （that is, Miku producers）, and over 170，000 videos have been 
uploaded featuring her songs. By far the largest participation is the over one million 
fan-made artworks that are in circulation as well. 
　　How did Crypton nurture these creators? By developing a relatively open ap-
proach to copyright. In Japan （as of 2015）, Crypton describes a three-tier system of 
copyright control, which they call the PiaPro Character License （PCL）. （PiaPro is 
short for “peer production.”） They have adapted this license for Japan’s specific legal 
and cultural context, part of which includes a long history of dōjin works. In an online 
video, Crypton’s describes their license like this: 
（ 1 ）If you are making images but not selling them in any way, you may do so 
without getting permission from Crypton. 
（ 2 ）If you are making goods and selling them, but only at a level to support the 
activities of your club or group （i.e., “non-profit” but enforced through an 
honor system rather than official legal designation）, then you are asked to 
send a merchandise sample to Crypton and in return, Crypton will send a 
2 D barcode （QR code） that you can reproduce and affix to your goods to 
show that you are officially approved. 
（ 3 ）If your Miku goods sell profitably, Crypton expects to be part of the process, 
and there should be negotiations on a case-by-case basis （Crypton Future 
Media, Inc.）.
This is a very interesting approach to creating multiple tiers of copyright depending 
on the users and their profitability, rather than on the type of work （i.e., original or 
derivative）. These rules are shifting, and depend on the acceptance of the broader 
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community to exist. In some ways, this is not so different from the informal operation 
of music sampling for DJs. If you are an indie-level DJ, you can often get away with 
sampling famous artists and sometimes even selling the works. But if you are famous 
or backed by a major recording company, then the artists being sampled can expect 
（and are more likely to demand） payment for sampling. What’s different about Cryp-
ton is that they are attempting to make this informal treatment of copyright some-
thing that is official and central to their business. For me, this is a perfect example of 
“cyborg capitalism,” whereby Crypton prioritizes the ethics of the fan community, al-
lowing fan production and sharing, and even some sales of derivative character goods, 
without requiring royalties to be paid. Rather than being zombie-like in extracting 
every bit of possible monetization, Crypton’s practices more closely resemble a cyborg 
ethic of respecting its connection and reliance upon its fan community. 
Conclusion
As we struggle to reformulate our political economic sphere to combat the negative 
consequences of rising inequality, the question of where new jobs and new industries 
might come from becomes increasingly important. Over the past 20 years, my re-
search has focused on forms popular culture, such as hip-hop in Japan and anime as a 
worldwide phenomenon, that can be described as globalization from below. They can 
also be seen as examples of emerging industries that, initially at least, generally lacked 
the support of elite power brokers, spreading instead though the efforts of passionate, 
somewhat underground communities. To me, this is cyborg capitalism because it illu-
minates the unseen synergies, what I’ve also called “dark energy,” among fans as 
much as, if not more than, the marketing muscle of major corporations. In realms 
where the super-rich have more sway―such as expensive real estate and high-end 
contemporary art―we witness more extractive forms of economic exchange, that is, 
zombie capitalism, as the super-rich attempt to move assets and hide money from the 
prying eyes of tax agencies. In this essay, I’ve offered a picture of some forms of popu-
lar culture that demonstrate how creative communities can be the foundation of new 
business models, or better, new social-economic assemblages, in which valuing and 
nurturing fan communities is as important as figuring out how to monetize them. 
　　To return to Kohh’s song, we can see how the cultural underpinnings of ideas 
about restructuring the economy through new measures of value are already under-
way. Arguably, this has always been the case for every generation. Kohh’s contempo-
rary voice highlights that he worked hard to get to his position as an artist, “but 
without those around me, I wouldn’t be here either.” We are seeing new thinking 
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